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The recent dramatic increases in both the numbers and prices of scholarly journnls are evidence of a dis-
torted economic marketplace for scholarly information. They can also be viewed as evidence of an impend-
ing economic "commons" tragedy for this nation's research libraries. The general economic principles 
underlying this tragedy were popularized in a nontechnical and very influential 1968 essay by Garrett 
Hardin called ''The Tragedy of the Commons. ''The strategies needed to manage our research library com-
mons effectively will require a fundamental reshaping of the present system of scholarly communication. 
The leadership for making the necessary changes must come from the research library community. 
. • . he venerable, centuries-old sys-
tem of scholarly publishing and 
-· . collection building in research 
libraries is in very real danger of 
collapse. Dramatic increases in both the 
numbers and prices of scholarly journals, 
especially scientific scholarly journals, are 
the most obvious manifestation of this im-
pending crisis. For the past two decades 
journal prices in the United States have 
outpaced general inflation by rates that 
would be totally unacceptable in other sec-
tors of our economy. In 1989, for example, 
journal prices increased by more than two 
times the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and, as recently as 1987, the rate of price 
inflation was more than five times the 
CPI.1 Not only do prices increase dramati-
cally, but the number of new journals also 
continues to "proliferate," as Herb White 
puts it, ''in total disregard of all economic 
indicators." "One publisher," he notes, 
''reported that over a period of time he 
had started 180 new journals and canceled 
five.'' 2 
To date, none of the attempts by re-
search libraries to cope with these dual cri-
ses of information glut and spiraling price 
inflation have been very successful. In 
fact, the most common strategies, that is, 
pleading for a larger acquisitions budget, 
or transferring dollars from monographs 
to the serials budget, have actually aggra-
vated the problem by accommodating or 
hiding it rather than dealing with underly-
ing causes. Even worse, argues White, 
these tactics destroy ''any remaining ves-
tige of a suggestion that library materials 
allocations as between monographs and 
serials [follow] any sort of professionally 
developed library plan."3 Clearly, current 
distortions in the scholarly information 
marketplace threaten the ability of re-
search libraries to continue to carry out 
their mission of collecting, preserving, 
and providing access to the scholarly rec-
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ord. Since research libraries are central to 
our current system of scholarly communi-
cation, a threat to their basic mission must 
be ·considered a threat to scholarly com-
munication in general. 
A puzzling and troubling aspect of this 
problem for research librarians has been 
the fact that until very recently (and to a 
large extent, even today) the scholars and 
publishers, who create, market, and ulti-
mately consume journals and other rec-
ords of scholarship, have seemed to ig-
nore or to be unaware of the problems this 
explosion in scholarly journal numbers 
and prices is causing for libraries. Herb 
White suggests that this is because re-
search libraries find themselves in a sort of 
never-never land between the ''true ven-
dor/client relationship" of scholarly pub-
lishers and the scholars who write for and 
then read their publications. Thus, "pub-
lishers don't treat us as customers, they 
treat us as purchasing agents, who simply 
perform the routine tasks we are told to 
perform." And because scholars, who do 
not directly experience the price increases, 
show "no objection to any of [the pub-
lishers' pricing] tactics ... , [they] are fu-
rious not with the journal publishers but 
with us [when we] ... hesitantly, apolo-
getically . . . apprise them of this prob-
lem.''4 
The economic relationship among the 
producers, consumers, and distributors of 
scholarly publications is central to under-
standing both the causes of, and the po-
tential solutions to, this impending break-
down in our system of scholarly 
communication through research li-
braries. The sections that follow review 
key papers and monographs dealing with 
the microeconomic principles that under-
lie the relationship among scholars, pub-
lishers, and research libraries. 
The theories of supply and demand and 
the way these affect the exchange of goods 
and services among the three direct partic-
ipants in the scholarly communication 
system are important for an understand-
ing of the individual components of the 
system. But I will argue that they must be 
seen as part of a much more basic and fun-
damental economic principle. This princi-
ple, usually called the "Tragedy of the 
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11Hardin describes how shared pub-
lic resources (the 1 Commons') may 
eventually be destroyed when indi-
viduals are allowed unrestrained 
freedom to exploit them for personal 
gain." 
Commons," was vividly described by 
Garrett Hardin in his 1968 essay by that ti-
tle in Science. 5 The essay deals primarily 
with the way cultural norms of individual 
independence and freedom of action en-
danger our common environmental re-
sources. However, the "tragedy" Hardin 
describes has much wider economic impli-
cations for the way societies manage all 
shared public resources, including there-
sources in our research libraries. Briefly, 
Hardin describes how shared public re-
sources (the ''commons'') may eventually 
be destroyed when individuals are al-
lowed unrestrained freedom to exploit 
them for personal gain. 
The current distortions in the scholarly 
information marketplace are evidence of a 
commons tragedy centering around our 
nation's research libraries, which share 
many of the characteristics of Hardin's 
commons. But, before describing this 
tragedy in more detail, we need to review 
the characteristics of scholarly informa-
tion resources and the microeconomic re-
lationships among publishers, research li-
braries, and scholars. 
THE NATURE OF 
SCHOLARLY INFORMATION 
One essential key to understanding 
these economic relationships is the re-
source that is produced and consumed, 
that is, scholarly information. When re-
garded as a commodity, scholarly infor-
mation, or just ''information'' or ''knowl-
edge" (synonyms used by many who 
write about these issues) has many quali-
ties that distinguish it from tangible prod-
ucts, like automobiles or wheat, on which 
classic economic theories are based. 
Harlan Cleveland posits the following list 
of unusual economic characteristics of in-
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formation: it is expandable, compressible, 
substitutable, transportable, diffusive, 
and sharable. 6 The last of these character-
istics, he says, the propensity for this shar-
ing resource to leak, is ''eroding the doc-
trine that knowledge can be owned, 
exchanged, and monopolized the way 
'real' resources can. " 7 Pat Molholt ex-
pands on Cleveland's list with the follow-
ing additional characteristics of informa-
tion. 
We are dealing with: 
• a commodity that does not depreciate, with 
all this implies for financing, tax structures, 
and accounting principles; 
• a resource that is freely available unless artifi-
cially impounded; whereas economic theo-
ries focus on scarcity; 
• an intangible that can render people jobless 
and force whole organizations to restructure 
in order to survive; 
• a resource that thrives on reuse, repackaging, 
recycling; one that has been growing expo-
nentially and under completely unconven-
tional rules; 
• a resource that has, as an important aspect of 
its use, something uncontrollable and 
unpredictable-serendipity. 8 
Robert Taylor describes four other impor-
tant characteristics of scholarly informa-
tion that can help us understand the ways 
publishers, scholars, and research li-
braries produce and exchange this unique 
economic good: (1) "A person cannot 
know before seeing (hearing) . . . infor-
mation, whether or not it is of use." (2) 
Knowledge ''about a chunk of information 
. . . in some ways decreases the need for 
that chunk because one may already pos-
sess a part of the information.'' (3) ''Many 
people can know the same facts, or own 
the same chunk of information without 
depriving others." And (4) "we tend to 
overproduce and to overconsume infor-
mation."9 
Together, these characteristics of schol-
arly information show it to be a poor ex-
ample of the pure private goods that econ-
omists use to model the interaction of 
buyers and sellers in a competitive mar-
ket. In a perfectly competitive market, 
many rival firms produce and sell stan-
dardized goods or services at quantities 
and prices determined by the total supply 
of, and total demand for, those goods or 
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services. Perfect information about the 
quantity and quality of those goods and 
services is available to all producers and 
consumers. Finally, and most importantly 
for an understanding of the scholarly in-
formation "marketplace," the sale and 
purchase of goods and services in a com-
petitive market causes no costs or benefits 
to third parties not participating directly in 
the sale or purchase transactions. (In eco-
nomic jargon, there are no "externalities" 
to these transactions.) 
On the other hand, scholarly informa-
tion does share many, but not all, of the 
characteristics of public or social goods. 
Social goods are often, but not always, 
produced and provided to consumers by 
government or other public agencies, or 
by employees of these agencies. More im-
portantly, they are goods that cannot eas-
ily be excluded from individuals who fail 
to pay for the service or benefit received. 
This ''free rider'' effect brings to mind 
Cleveland's observation that information 
has a propensity to "leak." Pure public 
goods can provide benefits simulta-
neously to more than one individual (of-
ten whole populations) without any addi-
tional cost. (Again, in technical economic 
jargon, the production of the good for the 
benefit of any one person results in posi-
tive externalities for all persons in a society 
and zero marginal costs for those extra 
benefits.) 
Fritz Machlup argues that knowledge is, 
in fact, a public or social good ''of the pur-
est type. . . . There may be a cost of the 
transfer of knowledge, of teaching it and 
learning it, but there is no additional cost 
of using it once it has been acquired. " 10 
Lawrence White notes that because the 
marginal cost to disseminate information 
"is frequently very low or zero, ... we 
ought to be encouraging ... [its] maxi-
mum distribution . . . once it is in exis-
tence.'' But, maximum free public distri-
bution ''may well interfere with the long 
run considerations of producing a flow of 
new information ... [since] people are 
not going to invest resources in producing 
information unless they think they are go-
ing to get a net gain from it."11 This eco-
nomic conflict between the private, mar-
ketplace incentives for the production of 
new information and the public, social in-
centives to subsidize wide dissemination 
of existing information is one of the keys 
to the tragedy of the commons explored 
below. While basically a public or social 
good that is widely available at little or no 
cost, scholarly information also has char-
acteristics that make its production and 
some forms of distribution, like journals, 
financially attractive to market for com-
mercial profit. This leads directly to the 
question of economic value. 
THEVADUEOF 
SCHOLARLY INFORMATION 
Defining an accurate economic value for 
scholarly information is complicated by 
uncertainty. In contrast to most commodi-
ties, like coffee, for which "people usually 
have a pretty good idea of how much 
[more] ... would contribute to their hap-
piness," notes Machlup, "we cannot 
know what a piece of knowledge may be 
worth to us before we know what it is. "u 
(Remember Taylor's observation that it is 
impossible to know about information be-
fore seeing or hearing it, and that, ironi-
cally, knowledge about a chunk of infor-
mation decreases our need for it.) 
''Because scholars can never be sure 
what piece of information may prove 
useful . . . they have a strong incen-
tive to encourage publishers to pub-
lish everything which might be use-
ful and to encourage research 
libraries to buy everything pub-
lished." 
In his 1970 dissertation on the scientific 
journal market, Sanford Berg noted that 
scholars ''cannot be completely certain 
about which items in [a] ... stock of scien-
tific information will be needed." Thus, 
''the result is a tendency to be complete 
rather than selective when organizing a ref-
erence library. '' 13 Because scholars can 
never be sure what piece of information 
may prove useful (and because serendip-
ity often leads to unexpectedly useful in-
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formation), they have a strong incentive to 
encourage publishers to publish every-
thing which might be useful and to en-
courage research libraries to buy every-
thing published. 
Another more technical aspect of this 
uncertainty characteristic of scholarly in-
formation has been described more re-
cently by Machlup14 and Aatto Repo. 15 
They argue that the failure to distinguish 
between the "use value" (or "value-in-
use'') and the ''exchange value'' of schol-
arly information leads to inaccurate esti-
mates of value. Use value includes the 
qualitative measures of how successfully 
individuals use the content of particular in-
formation products to accomplish infor-
mation tasks. Exchange value includes 
economic measures of the marketplace 
where individuals and organizations pro-
duce, store, and exchange information 
products and services. Exchange values 
can be measured using fairly objective em-
pirical data, while use value can only be 
measured subjectively by individuals, 
based on what they expect or perceive. 
The problem in much of the literature on 
the economics of information, says Repo, 
is that researchers ''skip from exchange 
values to value-in-use . . . without realiz-
ing the implications of the change.' 116 
Ironically, Sanford Berg's study, which 
accurately describes this uncertainty char-
acteristic of scientific information, 17 has 
been strongly criticized by Machlup for 
failing to make the distinction between 
use value and exchange value. Machlup 
argues that Berg and others are '' overzeal-
ous'' in their attempts to overcome the un-
certain value of information by trying to 
quantify or objectively measure the total 
benefits or value to society of scholarly in-
formation. They do this by substituting 
projected individual estimated benefits 
(use value) for actual measures of the in-
formation marketplace (exchange value). 
''Most economists have long since aban-
doned as hopeless and irrelevant the aim 
of measuring the total utility or total bene-
fits . . . of a class of good or service,'' says 
Machlup, because "demand ... for any 
one good or service is [based on]. . . the 
assumption that the prices of all other 
goods and services are given and un-
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changed, and hence the benefits which 
buyers of a particular good obtain. . . 
would depend on millions of other 
prices. ''18 
This argument, though rather technical 
and complex, is also another key to the 
commons tragedy of research libraries. 
When scholars, publishers, and librarians 
speak about the "value of scholarly infor-
mation,'' they usually mean the perceived 
or expected use values to individuals of 
particular information products, rather 
than the exchange value of those products 
in the marketplace. But when these neces-
sarily subjective, qualitative measures are 
used to justify the overall economic im-
portance of scholarly information, value 
estimates (not restrained by market reali-
ties) become inflated. 
When scholars are free to create new in-
formation without considering the eco-
nomic market for that information, and, at 
the same time, are free to use published 
information at little or no cost, they are 
more likely to overestimate its value. Simi-
larly, when publishers and librarians hear 
from the scholarly community only about 
the high actual or potential use value of 
this information and see continuing gen-
erous public financial support for its distri-
bution and acquisition, their natural ten-
dency is to distribute and acquire as much 
as possible. This surely demonstrates Tay-
lor's last characteristic of scholarly infor-
mation, its overproduction and overcon-
sumption. The next question, then, is 
exactly how, in microeconomic terms, 
publishers, research libraries, and 
scholars interact with each other in the 
scholarly information marketplace. 
THE SCHOLARLY 
INFORMATION MARKETPLACE 
The public good and uncertainty charac-
teristics of scholarly information lead to 
distortions in the ideal competitive mar-
ketplace that economists use to predict 
supply, demand, and prices of goods and 
services. In a competitive market one 
would expect the total production and 
prices of relatively uniform scholarly jour-
nals to be balanced by the limited demand 
for individual journal titles. Instead, this 
marketplace is distorted by the dual and 
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differential pricing strategies of scholarly 
publishers. Most publishers now charge 
one subscription rate to individuals and 
another substantially higher rate to li-
braries. And many European publishers 
charge substantially higher prices to U.S. 
libraries than to those in the rest of the 
world. Economists call these practices 
price discrimination, and define it more 
precisely as ''selling the same product to 
different buyers at different prices, where 
the difference in price does not reflect cost 
differences in producing or selling the 
product."19 
Price discrimination can only take place 
in noncompetitive markets (such as mo-
nopolies or competitive monopolies) 
where sellers can separate potential buy-
ers into submarkets that respond differ-
ently to higher prices. Each submarket has 
a different ''elasticity of demand'' (or the 
product has different "price elasticities" 
in each submarket). Price elasticity is 
mathematically expressed as the percent-
age change in quantity demanded divided 
by the percentage change in the product 
price. It measures the responsiveness of 
buyers to changes in price. Highly elastic 
markets are those where higher prices 
quickly reduce demand or where lower 
prices quickly increase demand. Inelastic 
markets are those where price changes 
have little effect on demand.20 
Current laws provide for the free trans-
fer of copyright ownership from the 
scholars who write journal articles to the 
publishers who print, market, and distrib-
ute them. This effectively removes any 
marketplace incentives from the scholarly 
community. It also provides scholarly 
journal publishers with enough monop-
oly power that they can divide the market 
into separate submarkets with different 
price elasticities. Margaret Quinlin, an ed-
itor at Aspen Publishers, recently wrote a 
special report for the Society for Scholarly 
Publishing. (SSP), in which she states 
clearly how important publishers feel 
price elasticity is in setting prices for their 
publications. "Price elasticity has a direct 
bearing on the pricing of publications," 
she says. "The publisher who lowers the 
price of . . . [a specialized publication with 
a 'price-inelastic demand schedule'] will 
not increase [sales] volume significantly. 
. . . In short, total revenues will be re-
duced and circulation will not be in-
creased. ''21 
Individual demand for scholarly jour-
nals is more elastic than library demand. 
As early as 1977, Fritz Machlup pointed 
out the extent to which this is true. ''Pub-
lishers . . . have given up the idea of sell-
ing to individual buyers [only],'' he said, 
''and are determined to charge what the 
traffic will bear in the supposed inelastic 
range of the demand curve-the research 
libraries."22 
In meetings with librarians, publishers 
argue that price increases to libraries 
result from overall increases in the fixed 
and variable costs of publishing, 23 the fluc-
tuating value of the dollar abroad, which 
makes it necessary to compensate for ex-
pectations of a weakened dollar b/' setting 
higher prices in the U.S. market,2 and the 
many new and increasingly narrow scien-
tific and scholarly specializations, which 
force fixed costs to be distributed over a 
narrower base. 25 Publishers also argue 
that, although the marginal costs of pro-
ducing journals for these different mar-
kets are about the same, the value or mar-
ginal benefit of the journal to each 
submarket is different enough to justify a 
higher price to research libraries. They 
reason that in libraries journals will be 
used by many readers, but the individual 
subscriber's copy will only benefit one, or, 
at most, a few. 
The magnitude of recent price increases 
and the size of the price differentials, how-
ever, have convinced most research librar-
ians that "publisher profit is the driving 
force behind the recent escalation of serial 
prices,"26 and that "publishers of aca-
demic journals have sufficient monopoly 
power to engage in price discrimina-
tion."27 In a recent editorial, James 
Thompson singled out for particular criti-
cism those "few publishers, owned and 
directed by large multinational holding 
companies,'' which openly seek monop-
oly power. He quotes Robert Maxwell, the 
owner of the Pergamon journals, who out-
lined his business strategy thus: ''If Perga-
mon could win the trust of scientists it 
could establish the ·standard journal in 
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each specialization, and that would give it 
a series of publishing monopolies . . . sci-
entists are not generally as price-
conscious as other professionals, mainly 
because they are not spending their own 
money.'' 28 
At a fall 1988 seminar on the future of 
scholarly journals sponsored by the Soci-
ety for Scholarly Publishing (SSP); librari-
ans, publishers, and scholars exchanged 
views on the present and future economic 
viability of the journal system as it pres- . 
ently exists. Mr. Maxwell's assessment of 
the price-consciousness of scholar/scien-
tists is corroborated in large part by the re-
marks of Robert Peet, a biologist who par-
ticipated in the SSP seminar. ''As a 
scholar," said Peet, "I am reasonably 
happy with the current status of scholarly 
journals." He did acknowledge the exis-
tence of both a ''library problem'' and a 
"publisher problem" caused by the in-
creasing "store of human knowledge" 
and the exponential growth in the number 
of researchers worldwide and their result-
ing publications. But he argued for "one 
fundamental principle ... [to] constrain 
all solutions to these problems. That is, 
there must be free access for all scholars to 
journal articles. We will tolerate, grudg-
ingly, travel as a necessity. But, we will 
not tolerate a strict pay-for-use system.''29 
To the extent that this view is held by most 
scholars, any hope that a competitive, 
free-market, vendor/consumer relation-
ship can be established between pub-
lishers and scholars is probably unrealis-
tic. 
In summary then, the scholarly infor-
mation marketplace is characterized by 
producers (academic scholars) who turn 
over gratis, through copyright transfer, 
the ownership of their products (scholarly 
journal articles) to sellers (scholarly pub-
lishers), who in turn earn a profit, not by 
selling to the ultimate consumers (again 
academic scholars), but to publicly sup-
ported agencies (research libraries) acting 
on behalf of the entire scholarly commu-
nity to organize, store, and provide free or 
low-cost access to these products. As Herb 
White puts it, "natural selection and the 
pressures of the marketplace simply do 
not apply here."30 
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The product exchanged in this market-
place, scholarly information, has many 
characteristics which make it quite differ-
ent from free-market goods and services. 
Most notably, it easily "leaks," providing 
extra free or low-cost benefits to the schol-
arly community at large; and yet wide 
public distribution will in the long run dis-
courage the primary mechanism now 
available for its distribution (scholarly 
publishing). Finally, the economic value 
of this product is distorted because its ex-
pected or perceived use value for individ-
ual consumers is confused with exchange 
value in the scholarly information market-
place. How has this economic situation 
become so dangerously distorted when it 
is in our collective best interest to keep it 
healthy? The principle underlying the 
"tragedy of the commons" may provide a 
key to the answer. 
THE TRAGEDY 
OF THE COMMONS 
The central story and dilemma of Gar-
rett Hardin's 1968 essay in Science can be 
briefly summarized as follows. All the 
herdsmen of an agrarian community use a 
free open pasture or "commons" to graze 
their cattle. This arrangement works rea-
sonably well for centuries because wars, 
disease, etc. keep the number of herds-
men and their cattle well below the capac-
ity of the land. Finally, however, a day of 
reckoning comes when the pasture is full 
and the ''inherent logic of the commons 
remorselessly generates tragedy.'' 
Each economically "rational" herds-
man seeks to get the most benefit possible 
from the commons and asks himself, 
''What value will I gain or lose by adding 
one more animal to my herd?" The posi-
tive value will equal all the proceeds from 
the eventual sale of the additional animal. 
The negative value will equal the over-
grazing damage to the commons caused 
by one more cow. But, since this negative 
value is shared by all the herdsmen, the 
rational herdsman concludes that his 
share of this damage is much smaller than 
the profit one more cow will generate. The 
tragedy inevitably follows because each 
and every rational herdsman sharing the 
commons reaches the same conclusion. 
May1990 
The end of Hardin's little drama is worth 
quoting verbatim: 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into 
a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is 
the destination toward which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 31 
Hardin goes on to point out that problems 
of pollution are examples of the tragedy of 
the commons in a reverse way. Instead of 
exploiting and thereby, depleting or tak-
ing something out of the commons, ra-
tional users decide to put in damaging 
things like sewage, toxic wastes, noise, or 
unpleasant advertising signs. 32 · 
"Perhaps most sadly of all, we re-
search librarians, who are charged 
with managing this commons, also 
encourage the exploitation and pollu-
tion of the research library commons, 
and compound the tragedy, by insist-
ing on comprehensive collections 
and unlimited free access for any and 
all potential users.'' 
Unfortunately, both the depletion and 
pollution manifestations of the tragedy of 
the commons can be applied to the current 
economic crisis in our system of scholarly 
communications. Publicly supported re-
search libraries share many of the charac-
teristics of the commons. Publishers, 
scholars, and even research librarians are 
all guilty of depleting and/or polluting this 
commons in the ways they "rationally" 
seek maximum benefit from its economic 
(budget) and scholarly information (books 
and journals) resources. The price dis-
criminating publisher, like the herdsman 
who chooses to add more cows to his 
herd, exploits the research library com-
mons by rationally deciding to maximize 
profits and charge whatever the traffic will 
bear in the inelastic range of the demand 
curve. The scholar who furthers his or her 
career or research goals by publishing as 
much as possible, and then insisting on 
free access to all other published informa-
tion that might be of use, shares attributes 
with the independent, free-enterpriser 
who fouls his own nest with pollution. 
Perhaps most sadly of all, we research li-
brarians, who are charged with managing 
this commons, also encourage the exploi-
tation and pollution of the research library 
commons, and compound the tragedy, by 
insisting on comprehensive collections 
and unlimited free access for any and all 
potential users. 
A deep-seated belief in the efficacy of 
the free-market system and Adam Smith's 
"invisible hand" (that is supposed to cre-
ate greater prosperity for all if we each fol-
low our own best interest) underlies the 
actions and views of each of these partici-
pants in the scholarly information market-
place, including research librarians. 
Katina Strauch, the head of Collection De-
velopment at the College of Charleston Li-
brary, in a recent talk on the economic re-
lationships among librarians, vendors, 
and publishers, argued passionately and 
effectively for the need to preserve our 
competitive system where ''the govern-
ment does not dictate whom you must 
deal with or at what price. ''33 But when we 
face the problem of managing a commons, 
says Hardin, ''we can make little progress 
. . . until we explicitly exorcise the spirit of 
Adam Smith ... [who] contributed to a 
dominant tendency of thought that has 
ever since interfered with positive action 
based on rational analysis, namely, the 
tendency to assume that decisions 
reached individually will, in fact, be the 
best decisions for an entire society.' '34 
Economists, on the other hand, realize 
that conditions of free choice for con-
sumers and profit maximization by pro-
ducers do not always result in socially de-
sirable consequences. In 1977, economist 
Fritz Machlup pointed out the long-term 
consequences of making the scholarly 
publishing industry dependent on what 
he called the "grants economy," that is, 
the resources produced and paid for by re-
cipients of public or private grants instead 
of private consumers paying out of their 
incomes. "Should trends of the recent 
past continue," Machlup said, "it would 
be impossible for the private sector of the 
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[publishing] industry to survive if it had to 
rely on . . . sales to private buyers not 
aided by grants. Whether the industry can 
be viable in the grants economy at the 
present rates of growth of costs on the one 
hand, and of gt:ants on the other hand, is 
the question. " 35 In a 1979 review of the 
theoretical basics of economic analysis for 
Library Trends, Richard McKenzie in-
cluded the following statement as a major 
element in his ''economist's paradigm'': 
There is a tendency for individuals within very large 
groups to fail to pursue "common goals" even when 
the goals are agreed upon by all group members. 
Therefore, voluntary collective action is not likely in 
very large groups. [italics in the original]36 
This is a very elegant synopsis of the crux 
of the tragedy of the commons. Unfortu-
nately, McKenzie did not go on to explore 
the implications for library economics of 
this part of his paradigm. , 
Herb White has been one of the few li-
brarians to state clearly some of these im-
plications. For instance, here are his con-
cluding remarks to a group of scholarly 
publishing executives: ''unbridled 
growth in the number of publications, in 
their size, and in their price, with all of this 
dumped on one pliant customer commu-
nity, cannot work in the future. Not neces-
sarily because librarians will become more 
assertive ... but because there is no 
growth in the resources of what continues 
to be the one and only customer commu-
nity. " 37 In other words, voluntary collec-
tive assertiveness among research librari-
ans is unlikely, even though we may all 
agree that collective assertiveness would 
help. Instead, White argues, only the ex-
haustion of our collective budget re-
sources will bring an end to the spiraling 
growth in scholarly journal numbers and 
prices. 
If this happens, the most important 
tragic consequence for our current system 
of scholarly communication will be the 
slow death of research libraries as much 
more than archives of the past. Their abil-
ity to collect and provide access to the cur-
rent scholarly record will be gradually de-
stroyed. The publishers and scholars who 
depend on the research library's budget 
and scholarly information resources will 
be forced to find alternative, and probably 
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more expensive, ways to disseminate and 
gain access to these resources. In the face 
of such discouraging predictions and the 
inexorable and seemingly inevitable 
forces leading to a research library com-
mons tragedy, what can be done to insure 
that research libraries (or some reasonable 
alternative) will continue to carry out the 
mission of collecting, preserving, and pro-
viding access to the scholarly record? The 
concluding section of this essay will ex-
plore a few tentative possibilities for pre-
venting this tragedy and managing the re-
search library commons for the long-term 
future. 
MANAGING THE RESEARCH 
LIBRARY COMMONS 
Over the past ten years or so, probably 
the most frequently suggested strategy for 
research libraries to deal with the spiraling 
quantities and costs of scholarly informa-
tion has been to use new electronic and 
optical information storage and retrieval 
systems tied together in regional, na-
tional, and international networks. The 
combination of these new information 
storage and sharing technologies, pro-
ponets argue, should make possible effec-
tive storage and retrieval of much larger 
quantities of information at much lower 
unit costs. In addition, networks would 
permit direct access to remote resources, 
reducing the necessity for every research 
library to collect comprehensively. 
A very influential statement of this vi-
sion of a technological future for research 
libraries was the 1982 Matheson-Cooper 
Report sponsored by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges and the Na-
tional Library of Medicine. The report 
called for strategic planning initiatives and 
major investments in information technol-
ogy to manage information resources 
within integrated networks.38 However, 
an important characteristic of the class of 
human problems represented by the trag-
edy of the commons, says Hardin, is that 
they are not particularly amenable to tech-
nical solutions. ''A technical solution,'' he 
says, ''may be defined as one that requires 
a change only in the techniques of the nat-
ural sciences, demanding little or nothing 
in the way of change in human values or 
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ideas of morality."39 To the degree that 
technology simply changes the dimen-
sions or capacity of the research library 
commons to deal with larger volumes of 
information, or transforms that informa-
tion into formats with lower unit costs, we 
may be only delaying the inevitable trag-
edy (or perhaps compounding it because 
of the high cost of the new technologies!). 
This is because the basic human patterns 
of overproduction and overconsumption 
of scholarly information described above 
will remain unchanged. 
Matheson and others have argued, 
however, that this report's recommenda-
tions are not, in their essence, a set of pro-
posed technological solutions, but rather 
an ''attempt to define the basis for a differ-
ent library paradigm for the future.' '40 She 
quotes Thomas Kuhn41 who remarked that 
the process of knowledge transformation 
may really mean the "reconstruction of 
group commitments among the commu-
nity of scientists.'' Such a reconstruction, 
Matheson says, "with respect to the man-
agement of information in the health sci-
ences would be an exceedingly useful 
thing.''42 Virginia Holtz takes this Kuhn-
ian analogy of the paradigm shift further 
by suggesting that the Matheson-Cooper 
Report provides a focus for a new world 
view where the "information user, rather 
than the library, and information per se, 
rather than the instruments which carry it, 
have become the central concerns of our 
discipline. " 43 In essence, what Matheson 
and others of this school are proposing is 
"the deinstitutionalization of [research] li-
braries" so they will shift away from 
building definitive collections of books, 
journals, and bibliographic data and, in-
stead, ''conceive of different ways to en-
hance the utility of our major [scholarly in-
formation] assets, to improve the 
productivity of the academic commu-
nity.''44 
Short of the kind of major rethinking of 
the mission of research libraries Matheson 
proposes, other useful suggestions have 
been made to manage research libraries in 
ways to avoid their over-exploitation by 
information entrepreneurs. Stephen Fein-
man argues that some sort of government 
. regulation of the scientific and technical 
information industry may be needed, and 
that this may best be justified if we cease to 
focus on the public goods aspects of infor-
mation and think instead of "knowledge-
information-communication packages'' 
as a form of capital. Feinman envisions 
"an information industry structured 
much like the banking industry'': 
Information banks would be chartered at both 
the national and state levels . . . The producers 
of knowledge, which would be captured by 
these banks, might be treated in the same man-
ner as individuals with time deposits .... The 
users of the system . . . might well be treated as 
people or in~titutions that obtain a loan [to be] 
paid back in terms of principal and interest .... 
Access to the banks would be broadly regulated 
by the central bank but controlled by the indi-
vidual institutions .... The central bank, con-
trolled by the government, would also define 
the limits of research, since knowledge that is 
not captured cannot be communicated.45 
As Feinman notes, this scenario would 
have dramatic implications for all parts of 
the scholarly communications process, in-
cluding elimination of the need for or pur-
pose of copyright. Since copyright is one 
of the keystones supporting the commer-
cial exploitation of scholarly information 
resources and products, most proposals to 
manage these resources better involve 
changes in copyright laws. Professor Peet, 
at the SSP seminar, proposed changes in 
these laws that would reduce ''copyright 
on journal articles . . . to a short period of 
time, perhaps one or two years." This 
would preserve incentives for publishers 
to provide the immediate access ''critical 
to the active researcher, [but] allow li-
braries to acquire backruns of . . . journals 
at little or no cost. " 46 
A growing number of research librari-
ans now argue that ways should be found 
to reduce the role of commercial pub-
lishers in the scholarly communication 
process dramatically. For instance, Pat 
Battin argues that the library should be-
come the center of a new kind of restruc-
tured university that controls and man-
ages the whole process of creating and 
disseminating ideas to advance knowl-
edge for the public good.47 Similarly, Rich-
ard Dougherty and Brenda Johnson sug-
gest that "if scholars and librarians can't 
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communicate easily through publishers, 
we must learn to communicate around 
them. " 48 And James Thompson thinks 
that ''the idea of the academy retaking 
control of the bulk of scholarly publishing 
is being forced into consideration b~ the 
practices of commercial publishers.'' 9 But 
even if these librarians are all correct, and 
''there is no technical or economic rea-
son'' why commercial publishers must re-
main a part of the "information conduit" 
for scholarly communication, 50 formidable 
barriers remain to changing the centuries-
old incentives and economic structures of 
our current scholarly information market-
place. Individual publishers and scholars, 
like the individual herdsmen in Garrett 
Hardin's story, are convinced that their 
journals and articles are all outstanding 
and should easily get a share of the limited 
budget resources of research libraries. 
"Each of them thinks," as Herb White 
puts it, ''that while indeed other and more 
marginal publishers [and scholars] might 
suffer, they would be unaffected. " 51 
Each of the solutions proposed above, 
as with other ''commons'' problems faced 
by our so~iety, would involve a radical re-
structuring of the ways scholars, pub-
lishers, and librarians think about and use 
research library resources. Appeals to in-
dividual publishers, scholars, or even li-
brarians to restrain themselves for the 
common good will not work. As Hardin 
puts it, appeals to conscience ''set up a se-
lective system that works towards the 
elimination of conscience from the race 
... [since] to conjure up a conscience in 
others is tempting to anyone who wishes 
to extend his control beyond the legal lim-
its.'' What we need instead, says Hardin, 
is "mutual coercion mutually agreed 
upon, " 52 that is, we must eventually give 
up altogether the idea of a commons open 
to unrestrained exploitation. In place of 
individual freedom to exploit, we must 
learn what Kenneth Boulding (1977) calls 
simply a sense of "community." But this 
is a ''long and painful learning process.''53 
If we are going to bring about the 
changes needed to avoid the gradual de-
struction of our research library com-
mons, it will take leadership and a com-
mon understanding of the grave 
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implications of continuing on our present 
course. It seems clear that current market 
incentives are much too strong to expect 
the initial leadership or understanding to 
come from publishers or research 
scholars. Because research libraries have 
been charged by society to manage our na-
tion's scholarly information resources, re-
search librarians must assume this leader-
ship role and develop strategies to avoid 
the approaching tragedy. The first step, I 
would argue, is to educate ourselves and 
our publisher and academic scholar col-
leagues about the true economic implica-
tions of the current scholarly information 
marketplace. 
It is encouraging to note that profes-
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sionallibrary associations such as the As-
sociation of Research Libraries have re-
cently taken major steps to begin this 
process of education. Witness the two 
1989 studies published as part of ARL' s 
Project on Serial Prices.54 These studies 
present their recommendations backed 
with convincing empirical evidence and 
solid economic analysis. They also em-
phasize the importance of an "ongoing 
program of education and publicity.'' 55 
Only when the impending commons trag-
edy of our nation's research libraries is 
widely understood will we be able to build 
the necessary political consensus for 
change. 
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